and present numerical results to show the effects of phases and repairs on the system reliability/availability.
Introduction
Accurate analysis of reliability of system requires that it accounts for all major variations in system's operation.
Most reliability analyses assume that the system configuration, success criteria, and component behavior remain the same. However, multiple phases are natural. The system configuration, operational requirements for individual components, the success criteria, and the stress on the components (and thus the failure rates) may vary from phase to phase. Various techniques and tools have been developed [1] - [4] to analyze single mission system.
Phased-mission system analysis also has received substantial attention by researchers [5] - [12] .
Depending on the requirements during different phases, different components may be placed in or removed from service or repaired during a phase to balance the system reliability and the cost of operation. in a space mission, the first phase (launch) is the most severe and uses many components for a few minutes whose failure rates are high. Using the high failure rates and exposure time equal to the mission time for those components is guaranteed to result into useless analysis.
In approximate analysis, most of the time only conservative estimates are made yielding the worst case unreliability of the system. One adverse effect of this is that the systems may be over-designed. A more accurate analysis avoids this, in particular where there may be wide variations in the parameters and system configuration from phase to phase. If one phase experiences much more stress than others then it is necessary to account for such effects properly. Different aspects of phased-mission analysis are discussed by several researchers [5] - [12] .
A phased-mission system can be analyzed accurately using Markov methods. However that suffers from state-space explosion and is expensive in time.
In [12] 
This function has a mass at the origin given by P(X = 0) = (1 -e -_T') . The second term represents the continuous part of the distribution function.
In order to illustrate the use of such a CDF, consider a component with a constant failure rate of A that is used in a phased mission system. Assume that the system has just completed one phase of duration T1 and is currently in the second phase. The above CDF can be assigned as the failure probability distribution of the component in the second phase. The first term in the above expression represents the probability that the component has already failed in the first phase. The second term represents the failure probability distribution for this component for the second phase. The time origin for the second phase is reinitialized to the beginning of the phase. We will use such distribution functions to represent failure probabilities of individual components during different phases.
3.1

Component
Model with Repairs 
and
Similarly if it is given that component X is failed, then the probabilities that it will remain up or failed are given
and 
The overall operational and failed state probabilities for a component can be evaluated at the end of phase p by substituting t = Tp in the the above expressions. 
Phased-Mission and Component Repairs
In analysis of reliable system when a system enters a failure state during a phase, the entire mission is considered to have failed. So the next phase only begins, if the system remains operational during all previous phases. If the components are not repaired, the success or failure of system depends on the cumulative operational probabilities and success criteria defined by the combinations of states of operational components. In such cases, as shown in [10] - [12] , one can compute the success probability of the whole mission.
Notice that a system state may be considered as a failed state in phase p but may be a success state in the next phase due to a less stringent success criteria. This is acceptable behavior even in reliable systems.
In such cases, all state occupation probabilities (SOPs) accumulated in such states up to only phase p are considered to be contributing towards failure of mission. Thereafter they are considered as part of success. This is key to correct analysis of a phased-mission system and is implemented in EHARP.
In certain situations, however, it is possible to design systems that include repairs to keep reliability high.
For example, in a long mision, to improve reliability and performance, it may be advisable and necessary to carry out repairs on system during operation of system. Since in different phases success criterias vary, all of the components may not be used in all phases. When certain components are not required for the system operation, they may be repaired and employed again in the following phases.
The repairs are to remain in ready state for future phases. In phases when repairs are carried out, the system status is not affected by the components under repairs.
In Markov chain representation this implies that the repair transitions are from failed states to failed states or operation states to operation status.
In such cases, we can compute reliability more efficiently using the approach of this paper.
For example consider two components, A and B, system which are used alternately in two consecutive phases.
Bothcomponents canfail in eitherphase but onlythecomponent not in usein a phase onlyundergoes repairs in that phase. Thesystem operational andfailedstates forthe twophases areshown in Figure1 In a repairable system, it is alsopossible that thesystem mayenterfroma failedstateto a success state withinthesame phase. Since thesuccess criteriaisspecified using combinatorial methods, thiswill happen if the system upor failedstatedepends ona component whichis alsobeingrepaired in thatphase. In suchcases, use ofcombinatorial methods onlywill not allowusto payusattentionto thefactthesystem maytransitthrough thefailedstates. Oneimportant consideration hereis thatmustsuchtransitions beallowed in thesame phase?
Strictlyspeaking, forcriticaloperation system, oncea system failurehasoccurred, it is catastrophic andmust betreatedassuch.Thisis,therefore, obviously not allowed forreliable system astheyareconsidered failedonce thesystem entersa failedstate.In that case, the technique of thispapercannot beappliedasthesystem does not remain symmetric. Such systems canonlybesolved using thetechniques described in [7, 9, 10] andthetools suchasEHARP.
Therearemanyotherscenarios where thetechniques developed in thispaperwill apply.In thispaperweare assuming thatcomponent repairs areindependent ofsystem statesandarecarried out based onthecomponent statesonly,the success criteriamaybesuchthat this doesnot impacttheresults.If onlythosecomponents arerepairedthat arenot participating in the operation of a systemin that phase then the success criteria automatically satisfies therequirement for correct analysis. Thisis thecase in theexample of Figure1.Thisis because theupor failedstateofsuchcomponents wouldnot affect the analysis astheydonot affect thesuccess criteria.Alternatively, if theapproach forsuccess is that "alliswellif theendis well,"thenalsothisanalysis can beused. Whatwemeanbythis is thatif it is thesystem stateat theendofa phase that counts andtransient statesduringtheoperation donot matter(ordonotmatter"much"), thenthistechnique canbeused. The availability then can be used to compute the performability of the system. This analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and is subject of our further research.
Examples Used in the Paper
To describe and show the effectiveness of the work here, we will use the following three examples.
Our first example is the the one described earlier of a two components A and B. system that can be represented using four states in a Markov chain as shown in Figure 1 . One component is repaired while the other is used for the system operation. Thus failure and success of system depends on the component being used. This may correspond to a factory floor where two machines are alternately used while other goes through its repair (or maintenance) cycle and is repaired as needed to bring it up to the fully operational state. We will consider a four phased system with different parameters and phase durations.
The second example is of a slightly bigger system where we have more scope to show changes in system configuration that lead to system failure and success and finer points of the complexity involved in analysis. This system consists of three component, A, B, and C. One of these components may be repaired in a phase while the other two are used in a phase in some combinations. The system remains operational as long as the specified success criteria is satisfied. The success criteria for each of the three phases is expressed using fault trees. Each time we use two components and depending on the requirements we may require both or any one of them operational. The failure rates of three components are An, Ab, and Ac, respectively, and these are defined for each phase separately. The repair rates for these parameters are/_a, /_b, and #,, respectively. Two particular configuration using two out of the three component are shown in Figure 2a .
A Markov chain for a three component system with all repair arcs is also shown in is not active, the corresponding arc may be dropped. We will use several combination of two possible success criterias in a three phase system. In each of these cases, one of the components will not be used in each phase and will be repaired. The component parameters and phase duration may vary.
Figure 3: (a) Three configuration of a three component system.
Example
3.
For our third example, we will use "all is well if the end is well approach." We will use the same three component system of Example 2 but will use all three components in each phase. The three phase configurations to be used are shown in Figure 3 . The components are also repaired in each phase. As long as a phase terminates satisfying thesuccess criteria.Wewill compare theresultswiththecasewhenrepairarcsare not allowed fromthefailedstate(analysis performed usingEHARP)andto noticetheinaccuracies incurredin computation. Due to a change in success criteria and repairs, it is possible that some combination of failures of components in one phase leads to failure of the system whereas the same combination does not lead to failure in some other phase. The following five scenarios arise in computation at the time of phase transition from phase p to phase p + 1. The first four of these are the same as described in [12] for non-repairable system.
1. A combination of component failures does not lead to system failure in both phases p and p + 1.
2. A combination of component failures leads to system failure in both phases p and p + 1.
3. A combination of component failures does not lead to system failure in phase p but leads to system failure in phase p + 1.
4. A combination of component failures leads to system failure in phase p but not in phase p + 1.
5. Due to repair the system in a failed state may transit back to a up state.
The mechanism to compute unreliability of a system at time t, whose behavior is described using fault trees for different phases, is to compute the probabilities of all events at time t and then evaluate the fault tree using those event probabilities. The events here are whether components are up or failed. We already have described mechanism to compute the event probabilities at time t in Section 3.1. Using that we can evaluate the fault tree applicable at time t.
The first three cases listed above directly contributes towards unreliability or reliability and are taken care appropriately by a fault tree evaluation. Fault tree for a phase include failure combinations which remain common in all phases and those combinations which are considers as success earlier but are treated as failure in the current phase. Such combinations can be treated as failure combinations over all phases as the system eventually fails in phase where this combination leads to system failure. These are referred to as latent failures in [11] . Hence applying the failure criteria of the current phases to previous phases is correct and appropriate.
The unreliability can be evaluated by evaluating the fault tree for current phase.
However, in order to compute correct unreliability, we must compute the probability of the system being in failed state in any phase. The fault tree evaluation for the current phase does not include the last two cases.
If a system stateis a failedstateup to phase p and then, it is a up state, the probability accumulated in that state up to the end of phase p must be counted towards unreliability. Such failure combinations can be identified using phase algebra as described in [12] .
The only additional complication now is due to repairs as listed in case 5. We need to identi_" the probability that is once associated with a failed state in a previous phase but now is been associated with a success state.
A straightforward evaluation of fault tree associates such probabilities with success states that get counted as reliability. We need to identify probabilities. This can be done by extending the phase algebra.
Notice that even if the success criteria remains, the last scenario must still be analyzed and accounted for.
Also notice that in most cases, we assume that the components being repaired are those which are not being required for system operation in that phase. Therefore, the success criteria will not remain same over all phases.
In a Markov chain-based analysis, it is easier to keep track of the system states, and therefore, change in system success criteria could be easily accounted for. However, in the case of a fault tree, this change needs to be accounted for by considering those combinations when the system may" or may not fail at the time of a phase transition.
Thus, our methodology consists of the following steps. We divide the system unreliability of a phased mission system into three parts: 
.((Ep A Ep+l) A Ei+2)" " A Ep).
In the above expression, we include only those combinations which are failure combinations in phase p but are not failure combinations in an)' of the subsequent phases. This expression can be simplified as
The form of the expression are the same as that is given in [12] . Reader who is familiar with the work in [12] shouldbecareful whilereading thesection astherearea fewdifferences forthe algebra herefromthe one described in [12] .Therulesfor manipulating expression aredifferent to account for repairs.In fact,they are same asapplicable for Boolean algebra andthe special treatment for non-repairable systems as in [12] is not. required anymore.Also,thecomputation ofprobability requires furtherattention.
Phase Algebra
Let Y = 1 mean that component X has failed. Then z = 0 implies that component X has failed and x = 1 means that component X is operational. Using this notation, for the system described in Figure 1 , there is only one possible configuration but the component used in a phase changes from phase to phase. Thus, the following Boolean expression describe the failure for any phase. Also, the component not being used in a phase is assumed to be repaired.
SE(X) =
Similarly, for the system described in Figure 2 the following Boolean expressions describe the failure combinations for phases using OR or A'VD configurations.
ORE(X, Y) : _ +
ANDE(X, Y) = x y
Notice that X and Y are only parameters here and will be replaced by A, B, or C depending on the use of components. It should also be noted that event _ denotes the failure of component X in that phase only. 
PFCAND(X, Y)vOR(Y,
Z
System Unreliability
Using the phase success criterias for different phases and phase algebra we compute the system unreliability as follows. For a P phase system, we first, compute the PFCp's for all phases assuming P as the last phase. Then the system unreliability is given by
where P(Ep) is the probability of failure evaluated using the fault tree Ep of phase P (the last phase) and the failure distribution function calculated for each component as described in Section 3. P(PFCp) is the probability of phase failure combinations for phase p.
Interpretation of Boolean Expressions
While computing probabilities of PFC/s, derived above, we may encounter expressions like xlx_x4xs.
What it means is that we are looking for probability of a combination of events where Component X remains operational up to the end of phase 1, fails by the time phase 2 ends, but is 13 operational againby theendofphase 4,andthenfailsbythetimephase 5finishes. Thefollowing treeis useful in explaining howto compute the probability of thiscombination ofevents forcomponent X. In the tree if we assume that the root at level 1 is representing an event that component X is up at the end of phase 1 (there is certain probability associated with it), then the left child (at level 2) is representing that it is up at the end of phase 2 and the right, child (at level 2) is representing that it is failed. We can compute the probabilities of these events using expressions for Pxuu2 and Pxuy2 from phase 2 parameters. Similar interpretation exists for children of level 2 nodes from phase 2 to phase 3 as the component state changes. To go from Component X has failed at the end of phase 2 to the state that it is operational at the end of phase 4, there are two routes, i.e., _-_ --x--5--x4 and _-_ --x3 -" x4. We need to compute the probabilities of both paths and then add them up to arrive at the probability of combination _-_x4. In the previous section, we outlined the mechanism to compute unreliability at the end of a mission, that is, the end of the last phase. Sometime one may be interested in computing the unreliability behavior during all phases.
This means we need to compute unreliability for each phase as a function of time. It turns out that this is not expensive and can be easily accommodated in our methodology as the PFCs calculation is recursive.
Recall that PFCs for a phase are computed as
Also, the unreliability at the end of a mission is computed using the expression
In a P phase system, we define PFCp = Ep then the unreliability for a P phase system can be written as
Thus. to compute unreliability at the end of phase p, we need PFC1, PFC2, ..., PFCp where the PFCs must be calculated using phase p as the last phase. We define PFCi,p as the PFC of phase i, i < p, assuming phase p as the last, phase. Then the following relation holds.
The unreliability of the pth phase is computed by using the following relation.
and the PFCi,p can be computed recursively using the results of PFCi,p-1 and Ep. With this recursive relation, one may compute reliability of phase p using the result of phase p -1.
Latent Failures
It should also be noticed that at the transition of a phase, one may see a upwards change in unreliability value at the phase transition time. This happens if the next phase has different success criteria than the current phase.
In that case it is possible that that some of the success states in phase i may be failed states in phase i + 1. We define them as latent, failures as the system may fail as soon as the phase change occurs. For example, in an automobile system, on a freeway we may be cruising at a fixed speed and we may not need the brake subsystem in a car.But assoonaswehit acity limit, a phase change occurs andif the brakes arenotfully functional, we arelikelytohit some othervehicle. Tocompute unreliability increase dueto phase change fromphase i to phase i + 1, we compute URi. Then, we compute URi+ which is just after the end of phase i and beginning of phase i+ 1. For this purpose, we modi_" the success criteria and it is now a logical sum of the success criterias of phases i and i + 1 evaluated at the end of phase i using parameters of phase i. We define this as Li = Ei + Ei+l with
Ei+l specified using component status at the end of phase i. PFCs also need to be reevaluated as Li instead of
Ei for the phase i (for earlier phases, we will still use E r and not Lp for p < i).
We will demonstrate our methodology using the examples described above in the following section.
Example Computations
In the first example, we use the two component system with four phases.
In the first phase, we require component A for operation (and therefore there is no repair on it, see discussion above in Section 4). Component B has associated with it both failure and repair rates.
Then we alternate between the use of component and repair.
Thus the success criterias for four phases are specified by
Using the above information, at the phase changes from p to p + 1, there could be latent failure (they are in this system) and to evaluate unreliability including phase change boundary, we will use Li instead of Ei as We assume that there is no phase change after phase 4. Using this information we can compute PFCs as follows. 
Then the unreliability at the end of phase p and at the beginning of phase p + 1 is given by the following expressions.
We computed numerical results using above expressions and parameters values which are easy to yetiS, by hand computation. We first used phase durations for each phase as 10 hours and value of failure and repair rates for both components in such a way that the factor _ at phase duration of 10 hours is equal to 0.9. Also, if repair is applicable, then parameter 3 in all phases for applicable components is also 0.9. Using, these parameter values,
we get the results shown in 
To compute the probabilities of these expressions, we need to expand the expression in mutually exclusive terms. It should be noted that when expressions are in product of expressions form each product expression can be independently expanded into mutually exclusive terms. Then a product expansion will give all terms which are mutually exclusive. So using this, we compute probabilities of PFCs as given below for this case.
= +P('5"_2aablc_) + P(g_a3bl_lC:)
We programmed each of the eight possible cases. We used failure rate for each component to be 0.0001/hour and repair rate to be 0.1/hour whereever applicable in a 10 hours/phase mission. The results for eight cases are shown in Table 3 . Here in phase name "A" means AND phase and "0" means OR phase. Then, we assumed that the failure rate for the component under repair is small, i.e., 0.00001/hour and recomputed all the eight cases. These results are in Table 4 . One can notice the difference in unreliability in the two cases. We are not
showing the results when we ignore the repairs altogether but, we noticed that the difference is significant in the first case and relatively less in the second case. 
